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ABSTRACT
nment.Management
There are many potential threats that come with conducting business in an online enviro
is going to maintain vimust.find a way to neutralize or at least reduce these threats if the organization
as the vocabulary needed
ability. This chapter is designed to give managers an understanding, as well
chapter also highlights
to have a working knowledge of on line privacy, vulnerabilities, and threats. The
y of the organization, its
techniques that are commonly used to impede attacks and protect the privac
any and all conceivable
customers, and employees. With the advancements in computing technology,
threats.
steps should be taken to protect an organizations data.from outside and inside

INTRODUCTION
The Internet provides organizations unparalleled
opportunities to perform research and conduct
business beyond their physical borders. It has
proven to be a vital medium for worldwide commerce. Even small organizations now rely on
Internet connectivity to communicate with their

customers, suppliers, and partners. Today, employees routinely work from areas beyond their
office's physical area. They regularly transport
sensitive information on notebook computers,
personal digital assistants (PDAs), smartphones,
and a variety of storage media:thumbdrives,CDs,
DVDs, and even on floppies. It is not uncommon
for employees to work offsite, at home, or out of a
hotel room. Outside the office, they often use less
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than secure Internet connections--dial-up, cable,
Internet cafes, libraries, and wireless.
Organizations often employ po11alsto share
infom~ation with their stakeholders, however;
these portals are not always secure from would
be attackers. In order to protect the organization
from vicious and malicious attacks, management
needs to understand what they are up against.
Even if the organization does not conduct any
business on the Internet, they are still not out of
hanns way. Viruses, Trojans, and spyware can
come from multiple sources; floppy discs, CDs,
thumb drives, and even from mobile phones. To
complicate the matter even more, the information
technology (IT) environment at many organizations has become obscure-partially due to new
regulations and industry standards. The standard
has changed, it is no longer enough to be secure
and protect the businesses assets, organizations
needtobeabledemonstratethattheyarecompliant
and that security is an ongoing concern; failure
to do so could leave them facing stiff penalties
(Forescout, 2007).
The purpose of this chapter is to address some
of the potential threats that come with conducting
business in an online environment. The chapter
highlights the relationship between privacy and
vulnerability and threats. It delves into techniques
that are commonly used to thwart attacks and
protect individuals' privacy. In the age of unrest
and terrorism, privacy has grown even more important, as freedoms are compromised for security.
The news is loaded with stories about security
breaches. For example:

In May of 2007, the news of the TJ Muxx security
breach shook up the banking and retail industry.
At first it was estimated that hackers had downloaded at least 45. 7million credit- and debit-card
numbers; however, court filings indicated that
number was closer to 96 million. Estimates for
damage range.from $216 million to $4.5 billion.
The breach was blamed on extensive cyber thief
activity within TJ Maxx '.s· network from 2003

through June 2004 and then again.from mid-May
2006 through mid-December 2006 (Schuman
2007). However, others blame the breach 0 ~
weak wireless security-Ou (2007) revealed that
the "retailers wireless network had less security
than many people have on their home network~·."
Another example is:

lnApril 5, 2002 hackers exploited vulnerabilitiesin
a server holding a database of personnel information on California s265,000 state employees. The
state responded, and the world listened. California
is one of the largest economies in the world, bigger than most countries. The attack included in its
victims, the then Governor Grey Davis and 120
state legislators. The breach compromised names,
social security numbers, and payroll information.
In response, the state legislature enacted a security
breach notification law Senate Bill (SB) 1386.
To put this in perspective, if on line privacy is
described in terms of a risk "triangle," the three
corners are vulnerabilities, threats, and actions.
Where actions represent anything the organization can (and should) do to mitigate attacks.
Applications, like ships, are not designed and
built to sit in a safe harbor, they were meant to be
used in churning chaotic waters. It is important
to understand threats and vulnerabilities enough
to have a good idea to of what to expect, so that
strategies and tools can be put in place to mitigate
the consequences (Bumgarner & Borg, 2007).

VULNERABILITY
Softwarevulnerabilitiesare not going away, in fact
they are increasing.According to the Coordination
Center at Carnegie Mellon University (CERT,
2007) there was an average of over 1o vulnerabilities discovered every day in 2003 (3,784 in
total). This number has jumped to over 5500 in
the first nine months of 2007.
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operating systems. Dr. (Rear Admiral) Grace
Hopper ( 1906-1992). a highly respected and accomplished computer scientist indicated that all
software has problems and that it is impossible to
havea "perfect" system. Shearticulated this point
using ~he_f~llmving example ... if the probability
module having an error in the
of an 111d1v1dual
code wasjust one in a hundred (I%), and that the
system had several hundred modules; then the net
probability of an error for that system would be
I 00%. This observation is particularly relevant
in that most commercial software developers use
complexcomputersofuvareprogramdevelopment
toolkits (SOK) to improve their productivity and
effectiveness.
Qualsys (2006), a security vendor, studied
over 40 months of data scans (September 8,
2002 to January 31, 2006) and identified nearly
1600 unique critical vulnerabilities from a total
infestation of more than 45 million vulnerabilities.
The data scan showed more than 60% of critical
vulnerabilities were in client applications such as
Web browsers, backup software, media players,
antivirus, and flash.
The Third Brigade found that vulnerabilities
generally fall into one of the following categories
(Aberdeen Group, 2005):
caused by incorrect config-

•

Vulnerabilities
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ured systems
Failure to turn off factory defaults, guest

•

accounts, outdated software
Failure to maintain anti-virus

and spam

.
updates
leavmg
values
default
Failure to change
holes
Well-know

•

bugs in system utilities

Poor or ignorant policy decisions
Unapplied vendor security systems patch;
Aberdeen states that 95% of attacks are

against known vulnerabilities for which
patchesarc available.
Vulnerabilities do not have to be broken program code;Norman ( 1983)indicatedthat errors in
systemdesigns,which provoke erroneousentries
by userscan also be considered as vulnerabilities
that can be intentionally exploited by attackers.
Individually and collectively vulnerabilities
can create major risks for organizations. Weak
policies and protection can result in the release
of personal private information (PII). The release
of Pll is not the only the problem. Another issue
is that hackers can obtain important data and
modify it. Suddenly, there are additional names
on the preferred lists, payroll, and accounts payable; and outsiders could be given authority or
consideration that they are not entitled to. An organization's strategicplanscould be compromised.
Additionally, the release of PII can weaken the
public's confidence in the organization, subject
the organization to litigation, large fines/reparation costs, and to rigorous investigations, as well
as oversight.

THREATS
Threats are not the same as vulnerabilities; threats
are things that take can advantage of vulnerabilities. Security threats, broadly, can directly
or indirectly lead to system vulnerabilities (Im &
Baskerville, 2005). An analogy might be an army
fort surrounded by the enemy where someone accidently left the fort's front gate wide open. The
open gate is a "vulnerability" and the threat is the
"opposing force." Translating th is analogy to datain formation, the vulnerability would be a "poorly
protected" system, and the threat is the criminal
hacker community. In this case, poorly protected
could be construed to beanyofanumberofthings
including absolutely no protection, software that
is not updated, inappropriately defined security
rules, and weak passwords.
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In general. it is important to ensure tlrnt sensitive infonnation and systems are protected from
all threats. both internal and external. lypically,
this is done by separating the systems from the
networks. However. this is not always possible;
with the advent of e-husiness there is a need for
organizations to share information.

For example: an organizationgh•es itspartners (A)
and (B) permission to look at its on line schedule
(instead of calling a clerk as they had in the past).
This can create the opportunity.for partner A to
look at (or mod(!}~partner B s data. If the data
is of a personal type, say medical. several laws
could easilr be violated. If it is indicated in the
privacypolicy that data/in.formation is not shared,
the individual whose data is released may have
rightful cause to institute litigation.
Clearswift, a leading provider of content security products, has categorized five major message traffic threat types as: asset theft, disruption,
repudiation, content abuse, and denial of service.
Asset theft happens via spoofing or social
engineering; when an outsider pretends to be
an authorized user and requests information not
available to an unauthorized user. However, more
commonly, it is the sending of sensitive information inadvertently or by disaffected "insiders."
Disruption is a common threat, which includes
anything that keep users ( and services, i.e., e-m ai 1,
fax ... ) from doing what they are suppose to do.
Otherworkplacedisruptioncan include dissemination of personal, pornographic, or "non-business"
information.
Repudiation (denial) is concerned with either
party (sender or receiver) being able to declare that
an event did not happen. Techniques like DiffieHellman Key Exchange pennit digital signatures,
which provide assurance that the message was actually sent and/or received by the intended parties.
Digital signatures are accepted as evidence in a court
of law. This is critical because oftentimes parties
involved in transactions do not know each other.
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Content ahusc is similar in scope of repudiation, but is focused on the content of the message
and not whether it was sent or received. It deals
with issues between the sending and receiving
parties over what was sent and what was received.
ncninl of service (l>oS) and clistrihuted
nos (IH>oS) results when a party is bombarded
with more messages than it can handle, causing
the system to use all its resources to handle nonlegitimate traffic. Th is can happen by born barding
the victim's machine with thousands to millions
of messages so that it cannot respond to legitimate
requests or responds so slowly that it is effectively
unavailable. DOS attacks are considered violations
of the InternetArchitecture Board's(IAB) Internet
proper use policy concerning Internet ethics passed
January 1989 ( often referred to as RFC 1087; see
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc 1087). In the U.S. (and
many countries), DoS is a serious federal crime
under the National Information Infrastructure
Protection Act of 1996 with penalties that can
include fines and imprisonment.

SOCIAL ENGINEERING
It is not always a technical issue--a perpetrator
can use chicanery and/or persuasion to manipulate
unsuspecting people into either revealing sensitive information (such as logon and password) or
compromise perimeter defenses by installing inappropriate software or portable storage devices (that
are seeded with malware) on computer networks.
For example, an approach of phishing is to ask
a user to fill out a simple fake online form. The
form itself asks almost no personal information;
instead, it pre-fills the form with some of the info
that the sender already knows about the victim. It
asks for a person to make up a login name and a
password. The criminal hackers know that most
people suffer from password overload and tend
to reuse the same passwords over and over again.
Figure 1 is a representative sample (taken off the
net November 4, 2007):
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RISK
Risk is involved in ever:1hing, every process, and
every system. Operational risk is often defined
as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or
failed internal processes, people and systems, or
from external events. Risk is one of those things
that no one can escape and is hard to define. In
general, risk is the probability of a negative outcome because some form of threat will be able
to exploit vulnerabilities against an asset. Many
define the value of a risk attack as: the value of
an asset times the probability of a threat times
the probability of an undiscovered vulnerability
times some "impact factor (representing reparations) times the possibility of the event. While
the formula (see Equation 1--risk dollar value)
is straight forward, coming up with the values
and probabilities is not. The important issue is
not the devised dollar value, but what does the
asset really mean to the organiz.ation and how are
they going to use it?
Equation

1-risk

dollar

value
Risk $=Asset
* Impact*
nerability

value
*Threat*
Likelihood*

Vul-

Elimination of risk is categorically impossible; the best that can be hoped for to get it
under control. Even if it were possible, the cost
and scalability issues of risk avoidance haYe to
be weighed against the cost of the probable losses
resulting from having accepted rather than having
eliminated risk (Pai & Basu, 2007).
Qualys, Inc. (2006) analyzed a global data
pool of more than 40 million IP scans with their
product QualysGuard. Data analysis revealed
the six axioms of vulnerabilities. These axioms
are important because they help management
understand the nature of possible attacks and
why and how their data could be at risk of being
compromised. Qualys Inc. (2006) believes that
"Understanding the behavior of vulnerabilities
is essential to setting effective security strategy
and proactively implement security solutions."
The axioms of Qualys's Research:

J.

Half-life: Is the average time it takes an
organization to patch (or apply a fix) to
half of the most dangerous vulnerabilities.
The 2006 findings indicate a decrease in the
half life to 19 days (down from 30 in 2003)
on external systems. They found that the
exposure of unpatched systems continues

Uncertainty
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during the significantly long period of lrn_lf~
·
life dissipation
and mcreases
as t I1e se verity
2.

.,..,.

4.

5.

6.

decreases.
Pre,·alcnce: Prevalence is the degree to
which the vulnerability poses 3 significant
threat. They found that half of the most
·1·t·
1 ,es are replaced
prevalent critical vu Inera l11
.
bvnewvulnerabilitieseachyear. This means
there isongoingchangetothemost impo1tant
threats to our networks and systems.
Persistence: The life spans of some vulnerabilities are unlimited as soon as the current
infection is addressed, a variant may appear.
In one day Sophos foundover300variantsof
the "Stranton"virus. The risk ofre-infection
can happen during deployment of machines
with a faulty unpatched operating system
Focus: The 2006 study data revealed that
90% of vulnerability exposure is caused by
10% of critical vulnerabilities.
Exposure: The time-to-exploit cycle is
shrinking faster than the remediation cycle.
Eighty percent of critical vulnerability exploits are available within the first half-life
after their appearance. Since the duration
of vulnerability announcement-to-exploitavailability is dramatically shrinking, organizations must eliminate vulnerabilities
faster.
Exploitation: Nearly all damage from automated attacks is during the first 15 days
of the outbreak. Automated attacks pose a
special hazard to network security because
they inflict damage swiftly with little time
for reaction.

Cannon and Kessler (2007) believe that the
rapid increase in breaches and incidents can be
directly related to technology. They indicate that
the increase in 1) computer processing power and
data storage capacity and in 2) higher data transmi~si_onbandwidth have acerbated the problem.
This m conjunction with the massive connectivity
of information systems afforded by the Internet
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ELECTRONIC RISK MANAGEMENT
There is a large group of people that believe that
in the final analysis of security breaches, that most
problems should not be blame~ on hackers or
malicious employees, instead the mstancesshould
be blamed on lack of common sense. To them, the
vast majority of breaches can be classified under
the title of carelessness. As in people not paying
attention to what they are doing, such as putting
a letter in the wrong envelope, adding a copy
to an e-mail, or losing equipment or hardware,
the real culprit is a lack of following procedures
(Padilla, 2007).
However, regardless of how breaches are
caused: by ignorance, carelessness, inside users,
or criminal hackers, there are a lot of them. The
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse (2007); indicates
that more than 48 million records containing
sensitive personal information have been involved
in some form of a security breach in just January
2007 alone. Cannon and Kessler (2007) define
"A data breach as the unauthorized access to and
acquisition of data in any form or fonnat containing sensitive information that compromises the
security of confidentiality of such information and
creates a reasonable risk of its misuse."
JDC indicates that strong corporate governance is the foundation of successful protection
of corporate assets from a wide variety of threats
(CNET, 2004). To that end, organizations need to
estahl_ish, educate, and enforce their policies to
effectively ensure the protection they need.
I.

Estnblish: Establish clearly written policies
a_nd procedures for al Iemployee comm un ication s. The rules must deal with acceptable
a nd unacceptable behavior for the Internet,
p 2 ~(peer-to-peer), e-mail, IM (instant messagmg), and blogging.

2.

.
.
Educate: Educate and Slit)
t por1 written rules
.
. .
.
an d po Irc1es with conrnar
.

t < 1y Wrde tr .
a1111ng.
The employees need to u d
n erstand that the
. .
. .
.
policy 1sa l1vrngdocument("t
r writ mutate as
.
, -~ ,
.
)l
ne\\ th1t.ats:md 1ssuesaris
,e )Utcomphance
.
.
.
.
.·
1smandatory. This can be a er 1t1calrssue for
. •.
an orga111zatro11because 111rsuse
(whether
'
.
.
.
deliberate . or accrdental) ca n I.esu 1t 111
the
.
"l) Ie l)Y the
being'"'. held. res•)
t1011
orga111za
t onsr
.
.
legal pnncrple of vrcarrous liability.
•.
3.
Enforcement of written rules arld po 1rcrcs
E.nf~r~e policies: With a combination of
drscrplrnary action and software. lf there
is any doubt about employee willingness
to adhere to the organization's usage and
content rules, consider applying a technological solution to the people problem.
Tools can help the installation of hardware
software, and/or appliances, and enforc~
established policies. The organization can
block access to inappropriate sites and stay
on top of employees' onlineactivity. Failure
to discipline employees fore-mail-related
misconduct may encourage other employees to abuse the system and could create
liability concerns for the organization. It is
important to communicate the policies and to
adhere to them. The American Management
Association (2005) Electronic Monitoring
& Surveillance Survey found that most
companies monitor employee Web site usage (76%) and use filters to block access
to inappropriate Web sites (65%). Slightly
more than a quarter (26%) of responding
organizations indicated they went further
admonishing individuals, they terminated
them for misuse of e-mail or the Internet.

The World Bank indicates that to reduce th eesecurity risk, day to day augmentation of e-security
internal monitoring and processes are neede~.
They indicate that proper "Risk managei~ent is
• e checklist per,,
.
achieved through a compre 11ens 1v
rkasawhole.
t
.
the cyber-nsks that affect t 11e ne wo

They have refined a "technology risk checklist"
based upon standards set by ISO I 7799(Glaessner,
Kellermann, & McNevin, 2004).

MALWARE
The term malware (malicious software) is typically used as a catch-all to refer to a variety of
forms of hostile, intrusive, or annoying software
designed to infiltrate or interrupt services from
a single computer, server, or computer network
without the owner's informed consent. The term
ma Iware inc Iudes a IItypes of trouble makers: such
as: viruses, worms, kiddy scripts, Trojan horses,
and rnacro(script-context)viruses. Malwareseeks
to exploit existing vulnerabilities on systems.
Malwarecan utilize communication tools to spread
and oftentimes it goes unnoticed. McAfee Avert
Labs (Bernard, 2006) has recorded more than
225,000 unique computer/network threats. In
just 10 months between January and November
of 2006, they found 50,000 new threats. Google
researchers (as part of the Ghost in the Browser
research) warned that one in 10 Web pages is
hiding embedded malware (Provos, McNamee,
Mavrommatis, Wang, & Modadugu, 2007).
The term malware is often associated with the
characteristic attributes of a virus; self-replicating,
something that embeds itself into other programs,
which in turn can infect other programs. The notion of a self-replicating program is not new, it
dates back to John von Neumann's 1949 lectures.
Neumann postulated the theory that a program
could reproduce itself. Nearly 35 years later, November 1983, Professor Fred Cohen substantiated
Neumann's work by creating and demonstrating
the first computer virus in a computer security
seminar. The name "virus" was provided by Len
Adleman (the A in RSA); (http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Malware)and (http://all.net/books/virus/
part5.html).
In 1989,John McAfee(ofMcAfeeAvertLabs)
defined a virus as a computer program created to
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mto
their ,·ictims. n'-)ris ch."'lningC'-'nsidered man
da'P-<>n•hnow
ers make distinction between
~.,... .....
t Of\. . RO<
.
difterent malware ,·arieties based on whe
ther it
is considered viral or nt"'ln-viralmalware (Caf
archio . .:!004):
~

Viral mah,·are typically replicates rapidly
and fairh· indiscriminately. its behavior
has a Ye~· ,·isible impact. Viral infections
mi£:ht be ·used as part of distributed denial
of ~service attack; worms like Code Red
are able to spread worldwide in a matter
of hours.
!\on-viral malicious software does not replicate. It is planted by hackers, or unknowingly downloaded by unsuspecting users,
or foisted on systems as part of a software
package to track the user's behavior and/or
software usage. Non-viral malicious software is designed to be "inconspicuous and
stealthy." These types of infections can go
undetected for long periods of time.
There are some virus types of malware that
are design merely to harass the users and
not to intentionally damage files or the operating systems. Malware like the Bearded
Trojan are of this style. The Bearded Trojan
displays a nude female and while it is potentially offensive or embarrassing, it often
makes people realize that they are vulnerable and could have been infected with
a
virus that acts as a key logger, or a Web bot
(Harley, Slade, & Gattiker, 2001 ).
Another example of a non-viral virus
is
the "ANSI bombs;" thankfully, they are
not common and they do not reproduce.
An ANSI bomb is a sequence of characte
rs
that is meant to redefine key(s) on a keyboard. Thus, when the user presses a key
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delete, or send
material (Harley et al., 200 I).
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Adware/Spyware
A particular annoying and dangerous
form of
malware is adware/spyware. The terms
are communally used as interchangeably. The goal
of this
technology is to gather information with
out the
target person's knowledge or permissio
n. This
type of software is used to watch and reco
rd which
Web sites and items on the Internet the user
visits
in hopes of developing a behavioral prof
ile of the
user that can later be exploited. The sligh
t difference between the two terms is the inten
t of the
software agent. Adware has an advertisin
g aspect
in the information it collects, whilespyware
tracks
and record user behavior (in the traditiona
l sense
of the word "spy").
The problem with spyware is that
users
typically store all sorts of sensitive and
personal
information in their machines that shou
ld not be
made public. Some information is prot
ected by
law, trade secrets, and financial data. The
loss of
personnel and customer information coul
d wreak
havoc for the organization. Additionally,
the theft
of stored information such as: bank account
numbers, credit card numbers, social security
numbers,
and pictures could also devastate the indiv
idual.
Another thing that makes adware/spyw
are
so pernicious is that anti-viruses &firewa
lls are
not very effective against them. While
a good
anti-virus program (AV) is an absolutely
essential
for any machine, even those that do not
connect
to a network (especially if the machine
accepts
removable media), it is not enough. AV
software

d ,..
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Step 1: The bot herder loads remote exploit code onto an "attack machine" that
an
might be dedicated to this purpose or
already compromised machine. Many bots
use file-sharing and remote process control
(RPC) ports to spread.
Step 2: Attack machines scan for unim
patched (not current with updates) vict
machines to launch attacks against.
orSteps 3 & 4: The victim machine is
dered to download files (binaries) from
another server (frequently a compromised
web or FTP server).
Step 5: These binaries are run on the victim machine and convert it to a bot. The
victim machine connects to the bot con
troller and "reports for duty."
Step 6: The bot controller issues com
mands to the victim to down load new
modules, steal account details, install spyy
ware, attack other machines, and rela
spam.
by
Step 7 : The bot herder controls all bots
).
er(s
troll
. •lng coinmands via the bot con
ISSU
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Whose Fault Is It?

World's Biggest Botnets
Storm
There is a new threat that of the super botnet.
\\ 11ile few acree on the actual size of these botnets... thev ~ hu12:e:
where the number of acti,-e
mem~
per ,:4~hour period (not just attached
zombies) of the net can be in the hundreds of
thousands. Currenth·. the largest of the new breed
of botnets is "'Stonn.- Stonn broke away from
the mode and uses a decentralized peer-to-peer
(P2P) communication. instead of the traditional
centralized Internet rela,· chat (IRC) model. The
P2P makes it toucll to track and tou12:herto kill;
you cannot render it mute by disabling one or two
central control machines.
Stormusesacomplexcombinationofmalware,
which includes worms, rootkits, spam relays, and
Trojans. It propagates via a wonn or when a user
visits an infected site or clicks on a link to one. It is
very stealthy, it em ploys a balance "use" approach
and a '"'fast-flux.,.,The purpose of fast-flux is to
circumvent the IP-based black list technique (see
black list). It does this by rapidly rotating DNS
records to prevent discovery (Higgins, 2007).
~

~

Rbot
Rbot is generally considered the second largest
botnet. It employs an old-style communication
structure using Internet relay chat. Because it
uses an IRC approach, it does not scale very
well and is unlikely to rival reach Storm's size.
Rbot's underlying malware uses a backdoor to
gain control of the infected machine, installing
keyloggers, viruses, and even stealing files from
the infected machine, as well as the usual spam
and DDoS attacks. The real scary part is that Rbot
[malware] is readily available to anyone who
~ants try to apply some kind of criminal activity
m the bot arena (Higgins, 2007).
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and Threats

The answer to this question depends on ,vho you
ask. It can easily be argued that it is the users·
fault. If the user keeps their antivirus up-to-date
and stays away from traditional types of sites that
harbor malware (celebrity), the problem should
be lessened. However, variants of viruses have
been tracked in the hundreds per day; it is hard to
keep current on protection when there is a whole
industry ,vorking against you.
Since it may not necessarily be the user then
it must be the developers, or the publisher for not
creating a product that cannot be usurped. Unfortunately, there are highly skilled, university trained
hackers that strive to develop the right code. After
all, there is really only one reason for botnets: and
that is to make money. Some people blame law
enforcement or government for not quick prompt
and decisive action. However, many of the bot
herders are in countries in which the U.S. does
not have jurisdiction. Politicians can pass laws,
but never be in the position to have them enforced.
To that end, in 2007, Senators Orrin Hatch
(R-Utah) and Joseph Biden, Jr. (D-Delaware)
introduced the Cybercrime Act to update existing laws and close what they say are loopholes
that online criminals can exploit. The bill takes
a multifaceted attack. It lowers the threshold of
evidence, it address not only damaged computers
but also to individuals. It prohibits the creation
of botnets that could be used in on line attacks. It
makes the threat of revealing (extortion) confidential information illegally obtained from computers
a crime (Savage, 2007).

Botnets: FBI Operation Bot Roast
In the second week of November 2007 John
'
Schiefer of Los Angeles, California agreed to
pl~ad guilty to felony charges for building and
usmg a botnet as large as 250,000 nodes to steal
personal identifying information (PII). The botnet was used to invade individuals' privacy by
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Dutch ad~'ert1s111gcompany. This was the first U.S.
prosecution under the U.S • federal \v,·r
• e t ap statute
for conduct related to botnets (Wilson, 2007 ).
The FBI and Department of Justice in an antibotnet sweep label as "Operation Bot Roast'' has
arrested three individuals for assembling botnets.
They are charged with felonies. One of the three
arrested is alleged to have used a large botnet
network to send tens of millions of unsolicited email messages. Another is charged with infecting
more than 10,000 computers worldwide, including two Chicago hospitals. "The 'bots' caused
the infected computers to, among other things,
repeatedly freeze or reboot, causing significant
delays in the provision of medical services." It
took the hospitals more than 1,000 man-hours
to clean up after the infections (Keizer, 2007;
Albanesius, 2007).
The government is working in conjunction
with industry partners to uncover these schemes.
These include the CERT Coordination Center at
Carnegie Mellon University as well as Microsoft,
and The Botnet Task Force, (a low-profile orga4 th
nization initiated by Microsoft in 2oo at acts
ss and providing
• d"
as a means of but! mg awarene
training for law enforcement).
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SEARCH ENGINES

•

A problem with most search engines is that they
~re ambivalent to content permissions. Certain
mdividuals (such as the head of payroll) may
• a II of the company's
• to view
·1
per111
have
ss1on
.
mformation. While other individuals (such as the
head of personnel) are limited in the type of data
are allowed to see. An employee may be given
permission to see their own information but not
that of the person working next to them. There
may also be certain individuals that are not allowed to see any information at all. Because search
engines typically can not take data ownership and
coordinate it with user permissions, problems can
arise when responding to a request.
"When implemented carelessly, search engines
have the potential to uncover flaws in existing security frameworks and can expose either restricted
content itself or verify the existence of hidden
information to unauthorized users" (Vivisimo,
2006). In this regard, poorly implemented search
engines could release large amount of personal
identification information. Imagine typing the
name of the CEO in a search engine and receiving a page that lists his personal phone number,
salary, and home address.

WIRELESS MEDIA
Organizations may think their mobile workers are
safe with their new wireless notebooks, but recent
WLAN tracking at the RSA security conference
showed a multitude of vulnerabilities. Some
common faults were that many users were using
hotspots, but had no idea who was sponsoring the
ports. In some cases, it was discovered that the
users were actually talking to other loc~l computers that also had their connections active (Shaw
& Rushing, 2007).
Wireless devices often remember the "last
to
" site they were connected to and attemptd'd
.
goo d
use them first. Which means that ,f the user 1
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not shutdown the port (disconnect from a hot spot
correctly), the computer will look forthatspotfirst,
e\'en if there is a more secure connection available. Another issue is that the por1 will continue
to actively search for a signal. A critical situation
can arise if the user forgets to disable the wireless
card, and then plugs his/her device into a wired
network. A couple of things cou Id happen-the
network will see the other port and might adjust
its routing information to accommodate it, in
the process it could bypass firewalls and border
security. Another thing that may happen is the
device might also connect to another device via
the wireless port, again bypassing some security,
but elevating the pennissions and authority of the
newly connected user to that of the legitimate user.
In either case, the result is a huge hole in security
(Shaw & Rushing, 2007).
Organizations are paying a very high price
for wireless management. The Aberdeen Group
estimates that it costs nearly 10 times more to
manage wireless services and devices compared
to wired-lines (Basili, 2007). In spite of that,
Aberdeen found that 80% of respondents were
planning increases in mobile wireless access.
The RSA Conference is an event that draws
thousands of computer users. Many of them
bring their wireless laptops (and other devices).
AirDefense (2005), a wireless security company,
credited by many as the founderofthe wireless security industry, found that more than halfofthe347
wireless devices it monitored during conference
were susceptible to attack. What is truly amazing
is not that it happened once, but just 2 years later
it happened again at another RSA conference.
AirDefense once again found that more than half
of the wireless devices at the conference network
were themselves unsecured and were vulnerable
to attacks; thus leading to the conclusion that the
people responsible for protecting enterprise data
were not doing a very good job of protecting their
own assets (Cox, 2007).
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Telephones
Wireless telephones with computer-enabled features (such as e-mail and Internet access) have
been compromised; Trend Micro Inc. announced
it had found security flaws on MS Windows
Mobile, a popular operating system used in the
smartphone. Many individuals that used these
devices are executives who routinely access sensitive information. In this case, the main risk is not
malware, but the risk of lost devices.

Mobile Encryption
The news regularly reports that laptops with
thousands of sensitive records on customers or
employees are lost or stolen each month. Organizations know the risks and the threats. These threats
are easy to understand but most organizations do
not allocate the resources necessary to protect
themselves. Encryption is an effective safe guard
for most mobile devices, and one that will relieve
some of the legislative pressures. However, it is
far from being fully adopted; a survey by Credant
(see McGillicuddy, 2006) asked respondents to
list reasons why their companies had not adopted
encryption for mobile devices.
56% indicated it was due to a lack of
funding;
51 % said encryption was not a priority; and
50% said there were limited IT resources;
in other words: "No one wants to pay for
it."
Mobile devices are often seen as low-powered,
low-capacity corporate tools. To which there is
considerable fear that encryption will add little,
but in the end will slow them down. Critics cite
that the idea behind mobile devices is to make
the user more productive by added convenience.
Anything that slows down the devices would
ultimately detract from the user's productivity.
Additionally, encrypted devices are harder to
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concem is the construct of engineering devices
for easy maintenance. These easy maintenance
devices can allow a person to literally remove
the internal hard drive from a laptop in less th8n
a minute and make off with all of the private data
that is in the machine.
Endpoint security is the total measures taken
to implement security sending and receiving data.
These measures include assessing the risk to the
clients· antivirus and personal firewalls, as well as
protecting the network from themselves. Endpoint
security logicaIly extends to the management and
administration of these security measures. It also
deals with risk, reporting, and knowledge management of the state and results of these measures
(Positive Networks-Endpoint security).

Endpoint Components
Firewalls
In general terms, a firewall is software or a
hardware device that controls the flow of traffic
between two networks or entities. A packet filter
firewall works by inspecting the contents of each
network packet header and determining whether
it is allowed to traverse the network. There are
basically three types of firewalls: packet filter,
"stateful" inspection, and application proxy.
In the case of a personal firewall, it controls
the network traffic between a computer on one
side, and the Internet or corporate network on
the other side. A firewall is a network (hardware
& software) node that isolates a private network
from a public network. The firewalls' job is to
keep unwelcome traffic from the Internet out of
the computer, and also to keep in the traffic that
you do not want leaving the computer. To that
end, organizations may have several firewalls
to create barriers around different layers of their
infrastructure. Firewalls are often compared to a
"bouncer" at a nightclub: they are located at the
point of entry; they enforce rules to determine who
gets in (and out); and they inspect all that passes
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rs
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possible
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approac I1, 11 1
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.
'f
password
is
compromised an mtruder
that even I a
will only have restricted access to the network.
However, firewal Is are neither the first nor the
last word in endpoint components. Ha~dware and
software firewalls have a serious flaw 111that they
t pically do not look at the contents of a packet;
y
.
,.
they only look at its headers. As wnt_ten ear _,er,
antivirus software is not very effective aga111st
spyware, the same is true with a firewall.

PREVENTIVE MEASURES
The open nature of PCs in most organizations has
resulted in users installing a wide variety ofapplications that they use to get through their day, and
several that they should not. Some IT managers
attempt to prohibit the use of unauthorized peripherals (removable media) and applications with the
hope that this process will shut out malware. The
usage of portable devices at work could impact
corporate network security through the intentional
or unintentional introduction of viruses, malware,
or crimeware that can bring down the corporate
network and or disrupt business activity.
Even with the tightest security net, it is possible
for a destructive breach to occur. Failure to implement a security audit process to meet government
regulatory requirements can result in significant
fines, in addition to the possibility of imprisonment. The risks are real and affecting businesses
on a daily basis (Juniper Research, 2006).
Further, not only are devices a threat to data
and machine integrity, but also to worker productivity. An employee can use company hardware
and software to enhance digital photos, play
computer games, or work on freelance projects.
The control of USB (universal serial port) ports
can Iim it unauthorized use and prevent intentional
or accidental attacks against a company's network
(Muscat, 2007). Control of the USB ports can be
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Strangers that send you mail, want
something!
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enter.
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However,
applies.
still
tioned
burdened by user names and passwords. The
number one suggestion is pick a strong password
and do not share it with anyone for any reason.
If you need to have multiple sign-ons, tailor the
passwords for each application. For example your
password for accounts payable may begin with
AP. The easiest way to pick strong passwords is to
create an acronym out of your favorite song lyrics.
Take the first letter of each of the first 12 words,
your application code and some important number,
like the middle digits of your first home address.

The Human in the Equation

While the chapter is aimed at management, we
would be amiss ifwe did not describe somethings
that the end user can do. This list is far from
complete and some may argue about the order of
which items are presented. They might also point
that import suggestions have been admitted. The
caveat is that this list is not for corporate users,
it is for the home user. For the home user, the

According to CompTIA's IT security survey, human error, either alone or in combination with a
technical malfunction, was blamed for 74% of
the IT security breaches (Cochetti, 2007). Human
involvement in systems is not limited to making
errors; during the day users often take breaks to
surf the Web, e-mail, or IM their friends.
However, Web surfing can do more than
relieve stress and waste time; it can expose users and organizations to dangerous Web sites,
data leakage, and e-mails with inappropriate or
dangerous content. Further, it can lead to installation of non-authorized software, which besides
prompting civil and criminal investigations, can
introduce piracy robbing malware. This type of
publicity has a negative impact on the bottom line.
To protect themselves, organizations shou Id abide
by a strong user access policy (Shinder, 2007).
Instant messaging (IM) has begun to be embraced by organizations because it provides a cost
effective means to electronically communicate
both synchronously and nearly instantaneously.
IM presence awareness and permission-based lists

I.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

Get a good anti virus package and keep it up
to date.
Let your system download system updates
(patches) from a trusted site.
Deactivate Active X components.
Do not install items from unknown sources.
Do not open e-mails from people or organi.
zations that you do not know.
link;
nail
d
Never click on an embe dd e e-r
.
copy it or use a book mark.
you
sites
what
t
Be extremely care tiu I a b ou
visit.

·~""

i'><.
··-,;

The End User

advice is simple:

...
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give the perception ofa low riskofreceivingspam
or other unwanted messages. The rapid adoption
of public IM services (such as AOL, MSN, and
Yahoo) has raised serious concerns about security
risks and compliance with regulatory requirements. IM and e-mail can be used as a tool for
deliberately disseminating private information;
or it may provide a channel that could inadvertently admit spyware. worrns, or viruses. Since
instant messaging involves free electronic communication with internal employees and anyone
designated as a "trusted'' colleague, unauthorized
infonnation dissemination may proliferate via
unmonitored (Webex, 2006).
Roger J. Cochetti, group director-Comp TIA
U.S. Public Policy states" ... security assurance
continues to depend on human actions and knowledge as much, if not more so, than it does on
technological advances." He indicates that failure
to follow security procedures (human error) was
blamed by more than 55% of the organizations
as the factor that contributed the most to security
breaches (Cochetti, 2007).

LISTING: WHITE, BLACK, AND GRAY
Listing is a response to malware's continuous
mutation of their signatures, which results in a
continuous flow of zero-day attacks. The basic
idea is to restrict execution of programs based
on a list. Listing comes in three distinct styles:
white, black, and gray.
White listing basically consists of al lowing users/workstations to run only software that has been
pre-approved by the organization. Implementing
this approach requires conducting exhaustive inventory of all applications in use as well as their
version. Once the inventory is completed, each application must be reviewed to ensure it is required.
After the review, the software implementations
and versions need to be made consistent across
the "protected" network segments.
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Black listing is the opposite of white listing. Workstations are prevented from running
applications or visiting Web site that arc specifically listed. Thus, sites that are found to be
perpetrators of ma Iware and spam are "banned"
from user activity. While this may seem to be a
viable approach for the business managers, it is
weak, and can be very risky, if not supported by
additional controls. A missed module can be disastrous. Further, new malicious or highly vulnerable
applications are created or identified faster than
they can be placed on a blacklist.
Gray listing is a conditional blacklist, and
has a high risk of false positives, blacklisting
someone by mistake.
Hybrid listing is a combination of features
thatcombinethe features of white, black, and gray
listing. It is designed so that management can approve some software and ban other software that
is not needed or wanted, thus preventing the first
execution of any new unknown software. Because
the hybrid approach prevents the first execution,
not the installation, the approval/authorization
process can be centrally managed in real time.
Browser-based listing relies on a modem
browser to check that the site a user is going to
is not a forgery. One option downloads a list of
known Web forgeries (see Figure 1-ploy to
capture personal information): but this technique
only offers real protection for a few moments after
it is downloaded. Another technique would be to
have the browser check with an authority (such
as Google) each time a URL or site is entered.
Mozilla indicates that users can protect themselves from Web forgeries by:
That instead of following links from a email to banks or online commerce sites,
always either type the Web page address in
manually or rely on a bookmark;
They also recommend using a Password
Manager to remember passwords instead
of entering them manually; and

ommend using....an e -ma,. 1 product
They rec
•
b
that will det. ect and alert the user a out suspect web sites.
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application security. Patching vulnernhil ities (depending on the severity) can be a time consuming
job. To do it safely, the patches should be applied
and tested in an isolated environment against a
copy of the system.
•

New components of clistrihuted architectures: Standardization and plug-and-play
are not always positive, they come with a
price. Standardize code makes it easier for
all involved the developer and the criminal
hacker. Each module represents a unique
addressable attack point-a target at which
criminal hackers can aim their exploits.
Mult
iplying network access points can
•
act similar to an open wound, if one is not
careful, it will allow in all sorts of viruses and the like. With organizations opening their networks to suppliers, clients,
customers, employees, and contractors,
security has become a mandate. Multiple
entry points have raised the importance of
controlling the traffic that comes and goes
through the network. Within this regards,
firewalls and antivirus products are important parts of an effective security program.
•
Wireless network access points bring
their own set of issues. With wireless, the
perimeter ( endpoint) security is critical. It
is important to have IDS (intrusion detection system) and to monitor all traffic.

•

Simply relying upon firewalls and
antivirus is not an effective strategy.
Understanding the network and understanding its weaknesses (vulnerabilities)
can provide insight on how to manage and
protect critical data.

CONCLUSION
No matter how hardened a network perimeter is,
there are a number of weaknesses that can allow
breaches to occur. It is usually recommended that
a layer defense approach be adopted to strengthen
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protection. However, care needs to~ tak_enthat
additional layers actually add protection mstead
of just protecting against the exact same vulnerabilities or threats. Reckless implementation or
selection of software may not produce the desired
outcome. A layered approach may be more like
buying overlapping warranty coverage. The hann
is that businesses may confuse this approach for
real security. Ultimately, they could end up spending more money and resources on implementing
the wrong security mechanisms without gaining
complete security (Ou, 2007).
Remember the organization is responsible
for maintaining the privacy of the stakeholder's
consumerwhi le also preserving a harassment-free,
discrimination-free, crime free, and civil business
environment. The development, implementation,
and enforcement of a comprehensive Internet
policy can help in that goal. Whether employees
intentionallyviolatelntemetpolicyoraccidentally
surf to an objectionable Web site, under the legal
principle known as vicarious liability, the employer
can be held responsible for the misconduct of the
organization's employees-even
if the employer
is completely unaware that there is a problem.
Simply following security best practice by
limiting access rights may be a good first step,
but it is just a step. No single approach is going to
be totally viable against all malware and protect
privacy. The best protection comes from using a
layer approach. In addition to using technology
it is important to:

•
•

Create and enforce policies and procedures
Educate and train
Monitor the network and the systems
Require Penetration testing
Ban inappropriate sites and prohibit wasted resources and productivity

Aberdeen Group's (2005) research shows that
technology, by itself is not the primary indicator
for success-this
was true despite differences in
technology usage, loss rates, or finn sizes. They
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also found that organizations p ,:, . .
.
.
er101m111gas best
111class leaders focus on niana 1 •
C'
.. .
gmg iour areas to
111ax11111ze
results for the money b .
. .
emg spent oi1
security.
I.

Sharing of data and know led ge to 1111
. prove
results

2.

Processes
in place for executitlg
.
. .
•
agamst
objectives

3.

Organ izationa I structure and strategy to
. manage to resu Its

4.

A security technology maturity that influences results

Of the four, they indicate that the most important focus area is the managing of data and
knowledge to improve results.
This chapter presented an overview of the
concerns that organizations must address while
working within the Internet community. It was
meant to inform management of the potential
threats and pitfalls that must be addressed to be
a viable player within the Internet realm. While
there are many technical areas that need to be attended to, nothing is more importantthan ensuring
maintaining the users' confidentiality, integrity,
and authenticity (CIA). Hackers and con-artists are
devising clever and inventive techniques to violate
a user's privacy for the purpose of committing
illegal activities. If left unchecked, these issues
threaten the viability e-commerce and e-business.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
This chapter lays out some of the issues that_must
beconcentrated on. Wit• 11 t I1e mo st emphasis be•zational Internet
ing placed upon a strong organi
.
.
. ti0 II0 wed by education
privacy and security policy,
. . o f users a,1d stakeholders.
and tram111g
d
how large an
•
Future research shoul d tiocus O 11
·ntain and mom 1or
small organizations create, mai
'
•
.
.
. .
Because organ1zapnvacy and security poltcies.
d"fferent
a-: •
·zes
and
have
'
.
d.
t1ons are of 111ering s1

resources available, research should investigate
how large and small organizations vary on their
approaches and implementation. Future research
shou Id also focus on how existing protections can
be expanded to protect tomorrow's technology.
Finally, research needs to be conducted on how
protecting portable storage devices from misuse,
as this type of media is bound to proliferate.

REFERENCES
Aberdeen Group. (2005). Third brigade-business
value research series-most important security
action: Limiting access to corporate and customer
data. Whitepaper. Retrieved October 2007, from
http://www.thirdbrigade.com/uploadedFiles/
Company/Resources/Aberdeen%20White%20
Paper%20--%20 Lim iting%20Access%20to%20
Data.pdf
Air Defense Press Release. (2005, February 17).
AirDefense monitors wireless airwaves at RSA
2005 conference. Retrieved October 2007, from
http://airdefense.net/newsandpress/02 _ 07_ 05.
shtm
American Management Association. (2005).
Electronic monitoring & surveillance surve_'r·.
Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.amanet.
org/research/pdfs/EMS _ summary05 .pdf
Basili, J., Sahir, A., Baroudi, C., & Bartolini,
A. (2007, January). The real cost of enterprise
wireless mobility (Abridged ed.). The Aberdeen
Group. Retrieved October 2007, from http://
www.aberdeen.com/summary/repo1t/benchmark/
Mobi Iity_Management_J B_3822.asp
Baylor, K. (2006, October 26). Killing botnets
McAfee. Retrieved March 2007, from http://blogs.
techrepublic.com.com/networking/?cat=2

s

Bernard, A. (2006). McAfee top ten security
threats/or 2007. Retrieved October, from http://
www.cioupdate.com/print.php/3646826

119

---....
....,_

"-..~.
I·, · _',•

•..

~. > rd

• acy Vulnerabilities,
Online P riv
'

Bumi:arner. J ••&

8('1n!.

~

S• ( -"'007). The US-CCV
t..~
. - d Novelllt""r

~
- . heck list. Retrte, e
crher sccur/ll c
/documents/US..- - - -..mhttn-//www.usccu.us
. o,120
_(){)r. tn:
"t..
. .o,1,?()Check%20Lrst,o

CCll%.:OCyber-Secunt) . o2(){)7.pdf

.
. :h. p ("'004) n,echallenge of non-vrral
Catan: 10. • •
. 4( 12) Re- ' rise !nsicht Ne,nlet1e,.
•
mah,are. 1 ·~
t I com/
•
i.~
"'007
from
"ww.pestpa
ro
•
tne,·ecJ (xtol'd
•
\\ 1,itepapersiNonVira1Malware0902.asp
L

. D. 1<,f
& Kessler, L. (2007). Danger1• •·
Cannon.
corporate data breach! Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance. 18(5), 41-49. doi: 10. I002/

jcaf.20322
CERT. (l00 7)_ Vulnerabilityremediation statistics. Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.
CERT. org/stats/vu lnerabil ity_remediation .htm I
Clearswift. (2006 October). Simplifying content security-ensuring best-practice e-mail
and web use. The need for advanced, certified
email protection. Retrieved October 2007,
from http://whitepapers.zdnet.com/wh itepaper.
aspx?&scid=280&docid=271750

and Th,

8 at11

.
·ty • (2004 ). What is endpoint secUE dpomtsecurr
n
.
d October 2007, from http://www
·ity? Retrieve
.
.
'endpomtsecurr
• .
·ty•org/Documents/What_1s - end• df
pointsecurrty.p
. d'rng, J • (2007 ' January 28). 25% of all cornFrei
net\· Retrieved http://blogs.techreputers on B '
?
_
public.com.com/networkmg/. cat-2

° ··

.

a. busiF Iynn, N - (2005). E-policy best practices
.
ness gu1'd e to compliant & secure mtemet, instant
(P2P)
and email
• g (IM) , peer-to-peer
messag111
.
.
communications. The ePo!tcy Inslltut~; Executive
Director, St. Bernard Software. Retrieved http://
www.securitytechnet.com/resource/security/appl ication/iPrism _ ePolicy _ Handbook.pdf
Forescout. (2007). N AC enforcement and the role
of the client. Jnfonetics Research, Inc. Retrieved
July 2007, from www.Forescout.com/downloads/
wh itepapers/1 nfonetics-N AC-Enforcement-andthe-Ro le-of-the-CI ient. pdf
GFI. (2007). The threats posed by portable storage
devices. Whitepaper. Retrieved July 2007, from
http://www.gfi.com/whitepapers/threat-posedby-portable-storage-devices.pdf

Cochetti, R. J. (2007, June). Testimony of the computing technology industry association (CompT/A), before the house small business committee
subcommittee on finance and tax, sata security:
Small business pen,pectives. Retrieved October
2007, from www.house.gov/SMBiz/hearings/
hearing-06-06-07-sub-data/testimony-06-06-07compTIA.pdf

Glaessner, T. C., Kellermann, T., & McNevin, V.
(2004 ). Electronic safety and soundness securing finance in a new age (World Bank Working
Paper No. 26). Washington DC Retrieved http://
si teresources. world bank.org/O EC/Resources/
abstracts_ current_ studies_ 2004. pdf

Computing Technology Industry Association.
(2004). Annual study. Retrieved October 2007 ,
from http://www.joiningdots.net/library/Research/statistics.htm I

Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W., &
Richardson, R. (2006). CSI/FBI computer crime
and security survey. Computer Security Institute.
Retrieved November 2007, from http://www.cse.
msu.edu/~cse429/readings06/FB12006.pdf

Cox, J. (2007, February 9). RSA: attendees drop
ball on wi-fi security-many IT security experts
at conference used unsecured devices. Network
World. Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.
networkworld.com/news/2007 /020907-rsa-wi fisecurity.htm I

120

Harley, D., Slade, R., & Gattiker,

U. (2001).

Viruses revealed: Understanding and counter
malicious software. New York: McGraw-Hill/
Osborne.

Online Privacy, Vulnerabilities and r,h
,
reats

Higgins. K. (2007. November 9). The world~~
biggest botn<'ts. Retrieved November 2007
from http://www.darkreading.com/document'.
asp?doc_id= I 38610

Norman, D. ( 1983). Design rules based on analysis
of human error. Communications of the ACM,
26(4), 254-258. doi:I0.l 145/2163.358092

Im. G. P•• & Baskerville, R. L. (2005, Fall). A
longitudinal study of infonnation system threat
categories: The enduring problem ofhuman error.
ACM The DATA BASE.fhr Acfrances in !,?formation Systems. 36(4). 68-79.

Osterman Research Inc. (2003 ). The impact of
regulations on email archiving requirements. ORI
white paper sponsored by Information Management Research. Retrieved October 2007, from
http://www.Ostermanresearch.com/whitepapers/
or_imr0l .pdf

Juniper Research. (2006, February). Security
i,formation & event management. Retrieved
http:/ /ww~v.juni per.net/so lutions/1 iterature/solutionbriefs/351178.pdf

Ou, G. (2007) Wireless LAN security myths that
will not die. ZDNet. Retrieved July 2007, from
http://blogs.zdnet.com/0u/?p=454

Keeney, M., Kowalski, E., Cappelli, D., Moore,A.,
Shimeall, T., & Rogers, S. (2005). Insider threat
studv: Computer system sabotage in critical infrastructure sectors. U.S Secret Service and CERT
Coordination Center/SE/. Retrieved November
2007, from http://www.CERT. org/archive/pdf/
insidercross05 I I 05 .pdf

Pad iIla, R. (2007). Root out data breach dangers by
first implementing common sense. TechRepublic.
Retrieved July 2007, from http://blogs.techrepulr
lic.com.com/tech-manager/?p=312
Pai,A. K., & Basu, S. (2007). Offshore technology
outsourcing: overview of management and legal
issues. Business Process Management Journal,
13(1), 21-46. doi:10.1108/14637150710721113

Kirk, J. (2007, May 17). Estonia recovers from
massive denial-of-service attack. Info World, IDG
News Service. Retrieved November 2007, from
http://www.infoworld.com/article/07
/05/17 I
estonia-den ial-of-service-attack _ l .htm 1

Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. (2007).A chronology of data breaches. Retrieved October 2007,
from http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm

McAfee, J., & Haynes, C. (1989). Computer
viruses, worms, data diddlers, killer programs,
and other threats to your sys rem · New York: St.
Martin's Press.

Provos, N ., MCNamee , D ., Mavrommatis, P.,
Wang, K., & Modadugu. N. (2007). The ghost
in the browser analysis of web-based ma_lware.
·
G oog Ie, lnc . Retrieved http·//www.use111x.org/
even ts/hotbots07 /tech/fu 1l_papers/Provos/Provos. pdf

McGillicuddy,

S. (2006, November I!· En• . A best practice no
crypting
devices.
I SMB
hSMB comhttp·//searc 1
•
•
' 9142 sid44
one uses Searc
28
techtarget.com/originalContent/0,
'
•
mobile

gci 1227295,00.html?asrc=SS _
CLA 300336&psrc=CLT - 44
17) Peri Is of portable
Muscat, A. (200 7 , January,., • Retrieved http://
t Reseller ivews.
f
crn eprint.pd
storage. Compu er
132686
www.gfi.com/documents
-

Si.x
I (2006 ) • The laws of vulnerabilities:
Quays.
. dO b
axiomsforunderstandingrisk. R_etneve_ cto er
2007 from http://developertutonals-wh1tepapers.
trade~ub.com/free/w _ qa02/pf/w _ qa02. pd f
07 October23). Proposed legislaSavage M •(20 '
· d
tion wo;t!dstren~then cybercrime laws. Retne:e
from http://searchsecunty.
Novem b er 2007 '
"d14
tee I1target •Com/origina1Content/0,289142,s1 gci 1278341,00.html?track=sy 160

121

Online Privacy, Vulnerab/1/tles, and Threats

Schuman. E. (2007, November 14). T.IMaxx's
projected breach costs increase to $2 16M. e WEl~'K.
RetrieYedNowmber2007. from http://fc42.news.
sp l .yahoo.com/s/zd/20071114/tc _ zd/219495
Shaw. K., & Rushing, R. (2007). Podcasl,
Keith Shaw (NetWorklfor/d) talks with Richard
Rushing chief security ~fficer al ... data, listen
to this podcast. Retrieved October 2007, from
http://v.v.-..,.·.networkingsmallbusiness.com/podcasts/panorama/200 7/022807pan-ai rdefense.
htm l?zb&rc=wireless _ sec
Shimeall, T. (2001, August 23 ). Internet fraud,
TestimonyofTimothy J. Shimeall, Ph.D. CERT®,
Analysis Center Software Engineering Institute,
Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA;
Before the Pennsylvania House Committee on
Commerce and Economic Development, Subcommittee on Economic Development, retrieved
October 2007, available http://www.CERT. org/
congressional_ testimony/Sh imeal I_testimony_
Aug23.html
Shinder, D. (2007, February 9). How SMBs can
enforce user access policies. Retrieved April 2007,
from http://articles.techrepublic.com.com/51001009_I l-6157054.html?tag=nl.el 01
Staff, C. N. E.T. (2004, September). Spam volume
keeps rising. Retrieved September 2007, from
http://news.com.com/2 I 14-I 032-5339257.html
Symantec. (2006, September 19). Symantec finds
firms recognize importance of application security, yet lack commitment in development process.
News release. http://www.symantec.com/about/
news/release/article.jsp?prid=200609 I9_ OI
Vivisimo. (2006). Restricted access: ls your
enterprise search solution revealing too much?
Retrieved October 2007, from viahttp://Vivisimo.
com/ or http:/ /www.webbuyersguide.com/bgu ide/
whitepaper/wpDetails.asp_Q_wpld_E_NzYyMQ

122

Wang, H., Lee, M., & Wang, C. (1998, March).
Consumer privacy concerns about internet marketing. CACM, 41(3), 63-70.
Webex.(2006). On-demand vs. On-premise instant messaging. Wehex Communications, Ease
,?f'Communications-On Demand EIMSolutions.
Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.webbuyersgu ide.com/bgu ide/Wh itepaper/W pDetaiIs.
asp?wpld=Nzc4MQ&hidrestypeid=I &category-=

Wilson, T. (2007, November 12). /D thief admits
using bolnets lo steal data. Retrieved November
2007, from http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc _id= 138856
Yank, G. C. (2004 December2 l ). Canning spam:
Consumer protection or a lid on free speech?
Retrieved October 2007 from http://www.law.
duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2004dltr0016.html

ADDITIONAL READING
Bacher, P., Holz, T., Kotter, M., & Wicherski,
G. (2005). Know your enemy: tracking botnets;
using honeynets to learn more about bots. The
Honeynet Project & Research Alliance. http://
www.honeynet.org Retrieved October 2007, from
http://www.honeynet.org/papers/bots/
Cohen, F. ( 1984 ). Experiments with computer
viruses. Fred Cohen & Associates. Retrieved
October 2007, from http://all.net/books/virus/
part5.html
Commission of the European Communities.
(2000). Proposul.for a directive of the European
parli<1111e11
u11d
l cf the council concerning the
processi11Kojj>ersorwl data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector.
Retrieved October2007, fromhttp://europa.eu.int/
in formation_ society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/
new _rf/documents/com2000-3 85en.pdf

II)

Ii

'"

c0111puter

Crime Research C
. . . . , _.
enter. (200S)
cun/J• 1ss110. find the enen,}. l . . R .. SeOctober 2007, from http://ww,
.· • etneved
. I
.
v.c, lllle-res
org/ana Iyt1cs security-insider/
earch.

w,a,,,,

MessagesLabs (20
busines~· r, • o7). Effectively securing small
• es rom on/' Ih
ber 2007 •f
me reats. Retrieved Octowhite
' rorn http://www.messagelabs.com/
_papers/secure _smb

Endicott -Popovsky. B., & Frincke D
Adding the fourth "R''· A ,
' • (2006).
.
.
•
S) stems approacl 1
solving the hacker s arms race 1 p.
to
• n IOceedin.,
the 2006 Symposium 39th Hawa · • l
gs<?
,, 111ernationa/
Co11fere11ce011 System Sciences R t .·
•
• • e t 1eved October 2007, from http://www.itl.nist
go ;· •;
- v 1au, vvrg/
hicss39/4_r _s_rev_3 _ HlCSS _2006.doc

SANS Institute ( 1999 M
In p 1•
. •
' ay). Management errors.
1mg,· ofth F d
<>cee<
C ,r,
-• •
e 'e era/ Computer Security
°'/1erences held in Baltimore. Retrieved Octol1er 2007 fro, I ti ·//
.
'
n 1 p. www.sans.org/resources/
enors.php

r

Sarbanes-Oxley. (2002). Sarbanes-Oxley act of
2002. Retrieved October 2005, from http://www.
~arbanes-ox ley.com/section. ph p?level= 1&pub
rd=Sarbanes-Oxley
-

European ~arliamen~ and the Council of the European U111on. (200., ). Annex JJ computerised
systems,Labcompliance. Retrieved October 200 7
from http:/ /wwvv. labcom p Iiance.com/docu men ts;
europe/h-213-eu-gmp-annex
11.pdf

Shinder, D. (2002). Scene of the cybercrime
(Computer Forensics Handbook). Rockland, MA:
Syngress Publishing.

Commission.
( 1999). GrammLeach bliley act. Retrieved October 2007, from
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/
glbact.htm I
Federal Trade

United Kingdom Parliament. (2000). Freedom
of information act 2000. Retrieved October
2007, from http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ ACTS/
acts2000/2000003 6.htm

(2006). ChoicePoint
sell/es data security breach charges; to pay $10
Federal Trade Commission.

U.S.A. DepartmentofHealth & Human Services.
( 1996). Health insurance portability and accountability act of 1996. Retrieved October 2007, from
http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/pl 104191.htm

million in civil penalties, $5 million for consumer
redress.Retrieved October 2007, from http://www.
ftc.gov/opa/2006/01

/choicepoint.htm
U.S.A. Federal Trade Commission. (2002). How
to comply with the privacy of consumer.financial
information rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley act.
Retrieved July 2 002, from http://www.fie.gov/bcp/
con Ij ne/pubs/buspubs/glblong.shtm

DidyouGETthe memo?
Ge1tingyoufrom Web 1.0 to Web 2.0 security. (In
Todays Risky Web 2. OWorld, Are YouProtected?)·
Henry, P.A. (2007,June).

Secure Computing

Corporation.

King, S. T., Chen, P. M., Wang, Y., Verbows_ki,
C., Wang, H., & Lorch, J. R. (200 6 )- Sub ~,rt:
. h • t al maclunes.

Implementing ma/ware wll
Retrieved October

v1r u •

2007, from http://www.eecs.

umich.edu/virtual/papers/king06.pdf
.

J

. •

7'

JJJ11111011
. /'e/ativism, edited by KuanchinChen

Theories <!J

'

.

,

,

.
. Online Consumer I rotecl'.o.,• ,, Reference (on imprint of/(,/ (,/obal).
by Information .Science •
This work was previously publtshed 1~
2 009
and Adam Fad/a/la, pp. 33-56, copyright

123

I

